neo4j-security-skill

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npx skills add neo4j-contrib/neo4j-skills --skill neo4j-security-skill

Documentation

SKILL.md

npx skills add ...

Documentation

SKILL.md

When to Use

Creating, altering, suspending, or dropping users
Creating roles, granting/revoking role membership
Granting/denying/revoking graph, database, or DBMS privileges
Inspecting current privileges (SHOW PRIVILEGES)
Implementing property-level access control (read/write per property)
Setting up ABAC rules against OIDC claims or native user tags
Referencing LDAP/SSO auth provider configuration

When NOT to Use

Writing Cypher queries against application data → neo4j-cypher-skill
Cluster ops, backups, server config → neo4j-cli-tools-skill
Driver connection setup → neo4j-driver-*-skill

MCP Write Gate — MANDATORY

Before executing ANY of the following, show the planned command and wait for explicit confirmation:

CREATE USER / ALTER USER / DROP USER
CREATE ROLE / DROP ROLE
GRANT / DENY / REVOKE (any privilege)
CREATE AUTH RULE / DROP AUTH RULE

Never auto-execute privilege changes. Show exact Cypher, annotate impact, get "yes".

Execution Context

All security Cypher runs against the system database:

// Neo4j auto-routes CREATE/ALTER/SHOW USER|ROLE|PRIVILEGE to system
// If using cypher-shell: cypher-shell -d system
// If using driver: use database="system"

1. User Management

Create user

CREATE USER alice SET PASSWORD 'secret' CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;
// CHANGE REQUIRED (default): forces password change on first login
// CHANGE NOT REQUIRED: password valid immediately
// SET STATUS ACTIVE (default) | SUSPENDED

Parameterised password (preferred in scripts)

CREATE USER $username SET PASSWORD $password CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;

Alter user

ALTER USER alice SET PASSWORD $newPw CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;
ALTER USER alice SET STATUS SUSPENDED;          // lock account
ALTER USER alice SET STATUS ACTIVE;             // unlock
ALTER USER alice SET HOME DATABASE mydb;        // default db on connect
ALTER USER alice IF EXISTS SET PASSWORD $pw;    // safe if missing

User tags [2026.06+, Enterprise]

Tags are arbitrary strings on the native user object, readable in ABAC rules via abac.native.user_tags().

CREATE USER jake SET PASSWORD $pw SET TAGS 'finance', 'auditor';
ALTER USER jake REMOVE TAG 'auditor' ADD TAG 'on-call';   // REMOVE before ADD before SET
ALTER USER jake SET TAGS 'finance', 'auditor';            // replaces all existing tags
ALTER USER jake REMOVE ALL TAGS;
ALTER USERS jake, alice ADD TAGS 'pii-access';            // bulk tag edit

SET/ADD/REMOVE TAG[S] requires SET USER METADATA; reading tag values requires SHOW USER METADATA:

GRANT SET USER METADATA ON DBMS TO userAdmin;
GRANT SHOW USER METADATA ON DBMS TO auditor;
GRANT USER METADATA MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO userManager;   // both of the above

Show users

SHOW USERS YIELD user, roles, passwordChangeRequired, suspended, home
WHERE suspended = false
RETURN user, roles ORDER BY user;
 
// tags column returns null without SHOW USER METADATA [2026.06+]
SHOW USERS YIELD user, roles, tags;
 
// runnable CREATE USER commands for the whole DBMS [2026.09]
// requires SHOW USER + SHOW USER CREDENTIALS; tags omitted without SHOW USER METADATA
SHOW USERS AS COMMANDS;
SHOW USERS WITH AUTH AS COMMANDS;   // includes auth provider config + credentials

SHOW USERS WITH AUTH AS COMMANDS exposes credentials. Use only for secured backup/restore handling. Prefer SHOW USERS AS COMMANDS when auth material is not required. Never paste auth-export output into plaintext docs, logs, tickets, or source control.

Drop user

DROP USER alice IF EXISTS;

2. Role Management

Create / drop role

CREATE ROLE analyst;
CREATE ROLE analyst IF NOT EXISTS;
DROP ROLE analyst IF EXISTS;

Assign / remove roles

GRANT ROLE analyst TO alice;
GRANT ROLE analyst, writer TO alice, bob;   // bulk
REVOKE ROLE analyst FROM alice;

Inspect roles

SHOW ROLES YIELD role, member ORDER BY role;
SHOW ROLE analyst PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS;   // returns runnable GRANT commands
SHOW POPULATED ROLES YIELD role;            // only roles with members
 
// runnable CREATE ROLE commands for the whole DBMS [2026.09]
SHOW ROLES AS COMMANDS;
SHOW ROLES WITH USERS AS COMMANDS;          // adds GRANT ROLE ... TO user
SHOW ROLES WITH AUTH RULES AS COMMANDS;     // adds GRANT ROLE ... TO AUTH RULE

3. Privilege Decision Table

Goal	Command
Allow db connection	`GRANT ACCESS ON DATABASE mydb TO analyst`
Read all graph data	`GRANT MATCH {} ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS TO analyst`
Read specific label	`GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst`
Read specific rel type	`GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb RELATIONSHIPS KNOWS TO analyst`
Read one property	`GRANT READ {email} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst`
Traverse but hide properties	`GRANT TRAVERSE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst`
Write (create/set)	`GRANT WRITE ON GRAPH mydb TO writer`
Create nodes only	`GRANT CREATE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO writer`
Delete nodes only	`GRANT DELETE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO writer`
Execute procedure	`GRANT EXECUTE PROCEDURE apoc.* TO analyst`
Execute function	`GRANT EXECUTE USER DEFINED FUNCTION apoc.* TO analyst`
All on one db	`GRANT ALL ON DATABASE mydb TO dba`
Full DBMS admin	`GRANT ALL ON DBMS TO dba`
Manage users	`GRANT USER MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO secadmin`
Manage user tags [2026.06]	`GRANT USER METADATA MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO secadmin`
Manage roles	`GRANT ROLE MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO secadmin`
Schema changes	`GRANT CREATE ELEMENT TYPES ON DATABASE mydb TO schemaadmin`

DENY overrides GRANT

// Analyst can read Person but NOT the ssn property
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
DENY  READ {ssn} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;

REVOKE removes a specific grant or deny

REVOKE GRANT READ {email} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst;
REVOKE DENY  READ {ssn}   ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst;
REVOKE MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst;  // removes both grant+deny

4. Common Role Patterns

Read-only analyst

CREATE ROLE analyst IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS            ON DATABASE mydb TO analyst;
GRANT MATCH {*}         ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO analyst;
GRANT EXECUTE PROCEDURE apoc.* TO analyst;

Write role (no admin)

CREATE ROLE writer IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS  ON DATABASE mydb TO writer;
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO writer;
GRANT WRITE   ON GRAPH mydb TO writer;

Read-only on specific labels only

CREATE ROLE limited_reader IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS    ON DATABASE mydb TO limited_reader;
GRANT TRAVERSE  ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO limited_reader;      // can traverse
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO limited_reader;    // Person props visible
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Company TO limited_reader;   // Company props visible
// Other labels: traversable but properties invisible

DBA role (full admin)

CREATE ROLE dba IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ALL ON DBMS     TO dba;
GRANT ALL ON DATABASE * TO dba;

5. Property-Level Access Control (Enterprise)

Restrict read access to individual properties:

// Grant read on all Person props, then deny sensitive ones
GRANT MATCH {*}   ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
DENY  READ {ssn, dateOfBirth} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;

Property-based pattern matching (sub-graph access):

// Only see Person nodes where classification = 'public'
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
  FOR (n:Person) WHERE n.classification = 'public'
  TO analyst;
 
// Block access to classified nodes
DENY MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
  FOR (n) WHERE n.classification <> 'UNCLASSIFIED'
  TO regularUsers;
 
// List-valued property contains a value [2026.08, Cypher 25]
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
  FOR (n) WHERE 'gold' IN n.clearanceLevels
  TO goldTier;
GRANT READ {*} ON GRAPH mydb FOR (n) WHERE 'EU' IN n.regions TO regularUsers;
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb FOR (n) WHERE NOT 'EU' IN n.regions TO regularUsers;
 
// Property on the right-hand side of a comparison [2026.08, Cypher 25]
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
  FOR (n) WHERE 1 > n.level
  TO analyst;
GRANT READ {*} ON GRAPH mydb FOR (n) WHERE 3 < n.securityLevel TO regularUsers;

value IN n.listProp — list property contains value
Missing or scalar property — no match
Left value — non-null, not NaN
n.prop IN [v1, v2] — scalar-against-list
Pre-Cypher-25 — keep property on left side of comparison

PBAC edge cases and export patterns → references/privilege-reference.md

Constraints:

FOR pattern applies to read privileges only — not write
Each property-based privilege restricted by a single property
Pre-2026.08: list membership and property-on-RHS predicates are rejected — invert to n.prop <op> <literal> or maintain a scalar flag property
Performance overhead scales with number of rules; TRAVERSE rules cost more than READ
Ensure the property used for rules cannot be modified by the restricted role

6. ABAC — Attribute-Based Access Control (Enterprise)

ABAC grants roles dynamically from OIDC/JWT claims or native user tags rather than explicit GRANT ROLE ... TO user.

Prerequisites

# neo4j.conf — providers must also appear in dbms.security.authorization_providers
dbms.security.abac.authorization_providers=<oidc-provider-alias>,native   # native [2026.06+]

Unlisted provider → its accessor function (abac.oidc.user_attribute(), abac.native.user_tags()) unavailable and rules referencing it fail (no silent default).

Create auth rule

CREATE AUTH RULE salesRule
  SET CONDITION abac.oidc.user_attribute('department') = 'sales';
 
GRANT ROLE analyst TO AUTH RULE salesRule;

Compound conditions

CREATE OR REPLACE AUTH RULE seniorRule
  SET CONDITION abac.oidc.user_attribute('department') = 'engineering'
    AND abac.oidc.user_attribute('level') >= 5;
 
GRANT ROLE senior_engineer TO AUTH RULE seniorRule;

Manage auth rules

SHOW AUTH RULES YIELD ruleName, condition, roles;
ALTER AUTH RULE salesRule SET ENABLED false;     // disable without dropping
RENAME AUTH RULE salesRule TO salesDeptRule;
DROP AUTH RULE salesDeptRule;
REVOKE ROLE analyst FROM AUTH RULE salesRule;

Native users [2026.06+]: tag native DB users (see User tags) and match tags in rules via abac.native.user_tags() — no OIDC required:

CREATE AUTH RULE nativeSalesRule
  SET CONDITION 'sales' IN abac.native.user_tags();
GRANT ROLE analyst TO AUTH RULE nativeSalesRule;
 
// require several tags at once
CREATE AUTH RULE financeAuditRule
  SET CONDITION all(tag IN ['finance', 'auditor'] WHERE tag IN abac.native.user_tags());
 
// combine tags with OIDC claims and temporal conditions
CREATE AUTH RULE onCallRule
  SET CONDITION 'on-call' IN abac.native.user_tags()
    AND abac.oidc.user_attribute('department') = 'engineering'
    AND time.transaction('UTC').hour >= 9;

❌ Never condition on tag absence: NOT ('restricted' IN abac.native.user_tags()) — any user created without tags satisfies it, escalating privileges. ✅ Require presence of a tag: 'unrestricted' IN abac.native.user_tags().

Notes:

Missing claims evaluate to NULL → rule condition false → role not granted
Rules apply immediately to existing sessions when claims are already loaded
OIDC claims via abac.oidc.user_attribute(); native user tags via abac.native.user_tags() [2026.06+]. LDAP has no accessor function — tag the LDAP user's native user object instead
User-defined functions rejected in PBAC property-rule predicates [2026.06+]
Infinigraph (sharded property databases) supports PBAC READ only, granted on the virtual database [2026.07+, not on Aura] — see references/privilege-reference.md

7. SHOW PRIVILEGES Patterns

// All privileges in the system
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *;
 
// Privileges for a specific user (as runnable commands)
SHOW USER alice PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS;
 
// Privileges for a specific role
SHOW ROLE analyst PRIVILEGES YIELD privilege, action, resource, graph, segment;
 
// Privileges of roles granted to an auth rule [2026.09]
SHOW AUTH RULES salesRule PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS;
 
// Find who has access to a database
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *
WHERE graph = 'mydb'
RETURN role, action, resource, segment ORDER BY role;
 
// Find all DENY rules
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *
WHERE access = 'DENIED'
RETURN role, action, resource, segment;

8. Built-in Roles (do not drop)

Role	Scope
`admin`	Full DBMS + all databases
`architect`	Schema changes + write on all databases
`publisher`	Write on all databases
`editor`	Write excluding schema changes
`reader`	Read-only on all databases
`public`	All users implicitly; default home database access

Assign built-in roles: GRANT ROLE reader TO alice;

9. Auth Provider Config Reference (operational — not Cypher)

Native (default)

dbms.security.auth_enabled=true
dbms.security.auth_max_failed_attempts=3    # lockout threshold

LDAP

dbms.security.auth_provider=ldap
dbms.security.ldap.host=ldap://ldap.example.com
dbms.security.ldap.authentication.mechanism=simple
dbms.security.ldap.authentication.user_dn_template=uid={0},ou=users,dc=example,dc=com
dbms.security.ldap.authorization.group_membership_attributes=memberOf
dbms.security.ldap.authorization.group_to_role_mapping=\
  "cn=analysts,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com" = analyst;\
  "cn=admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com"   = admin

OIDC / SSO (Okta, Auth0, Entra ID)

dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.display_name=Okta
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.auth_flow=pkce      # `implicit` deprecated 2026.06, removal planned — keep pkce
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.well_known_discovery_uri=https://example.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.audience=neo4j
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.claims.username=email
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.claims.groups=groups
dbms.security.oidc.<alias>.authorization.group_to_role_mapping=\
  "neo4j-analysts" = analyst;\
  "neo4j-admins"   = admin

Config changes require server restart. Roles referenced in mappings must exist in Neo4j (native or created via Cypher).

Checklist — New Role Setup

Full privilege syntax → references/privilege-reference.md